So far, however, U.S. utilities have not widely deployed current blocking devices on the live network. “They’ve just done things, such as switching to ever-higher operating voltages,” for cheaper transmission, “which greatly increase their vulnerability to these storms,” Kappenman tells me.
Tom Berger, former director of the U.S. government’s Space Weather Prediction Center, also expressed doubts about the network’s operators. “When I talk to them, they tell me that they understand the space climate and that they are prepared,” he says. But Berger’s confidence waned after the collapse of the Texas power grid in February 2021, which killed hundreds of people, left millions of homes and businesses without heat, and caused damage of about $ 200 billion. . That crisis was caused by nothing more exotic than a big pot of cold. “We felt the same way,” Berger says. “’We understand winter; no problem. ‘”
I contacted 12 of the largest utilities in the country to request information on specific measures taken to mitigate the damage from a major geomagnetic event. American Electric Power, the country’s largest transmission network, was the only company to share specific measures, which it says include regular hardware upgrades, a reorientation of power during a storm, and the rapid replacement of equipment. after an event. Two other companies, Consolidated Edison and Exelon, claim to have equipped their systems with geomagnetic monitoring sensors and are instructing their operators on unspecified “procedures”. Florida Power & Light declined to comment significantly, citing security risks. The other eight did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
At this point, curious minds may wonder if even utility companies are forced to plan for geomagnetic storms. The answer is complicated, in a purely American way. In 2005, when George W. Bush, a former oil executive, took over the Oval Office, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which included a gift bag for the oil and gas industry. It overturned much of the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to regulate the utilities industry. Reliability standards are now being developed and applied by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, a business association that represents the interests of these same companies.
Some find NERC’s reliability standards ridiculous. (Two interviewees laughed audibly when asked about them.) Kappenman opposed the first set of standards, proposed in 2015, arguing that they were too lenient: they did not need public services to prepare for a storm in the same as in 1859 or 1921. Berger was also questioned, but for a different reason: the standards made no mention of the duration of the storm. The ground effects of the Carrington event lasted four or five consecutive days; a transformer built to withstand 10 seconds of current is very different from one prepared for 120 hours.
Under pressure from the federal government, NERC enacted stricter standards in 2019. In a lengthy written statement, Rachel Sherrard, a spokeswoman for the group, stressed that U.S. utilities are now expected to face a event twice as strong as the 1989 Quebec storm. new standards require utilities to address vulnerabilities in their systems, and companies themselves determine the right approach and timeline.
If utilities remain unmotivated, humanity’s ability to withstand a major geomagnetic storm will largely depend on our ability to replace damaged transformers. A 2020 U.S. Department of Commerce survey found that the nation imported more than 80 percent of its major transformers and components. Under normal conditions of supply and demand, the execution times of these structures can reach two years. “People outside the industry don’t understand how difficult these things are to make,” Kappenman says. Experts know that they should not buy a transformer unless the factory that made it is at least 10 years old. “It takes so long to solve problems,” he says. In a time of solar crisis, foreign governments, even geopolitical allies, can limit exports of vital electrical equipment, Kappenman notes. Over the last decade, some spare parts programs have emerged that allow participants to pool resources in various disaster scenarios. However, the federal authorities do not know the size and location of these spare parts, because the industry will not tell them.
One day regulators can manage to map the power grid, even storm-proof (as long as a large one doesn’t remove it first). Engineers can launch an array of satellites that give us days to cut the hatches. Governments can find a way to hold emergency transformers in a pinch. And there will be the sun: the inconceivable and inextinguishable furnace at the center of our solar system that destroys as indiscriminately as it creates. Life on this little paw depends entirely on the mercy of a cosmic nuclear energy with a itchy cat finger. No human triumph will ever change that. (But we should still buy the capacitors. Soon, please.)
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